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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

AMERICAN INVES:T:MENT CORPORATION, a corporation,
Plaintiff,

vs.
THE STATE TAX OOM·MISSION
OF UTAH and IRWIN ARNOVITZ, R. E. HAMMOND·, H. P.
LEATHAM and B. H. RO£INSON,
the Members of said Commission,

No. 6312

Defendarnts.

PETITION FOR REHEARING AND BRIEF
IN SUPPORT THEREOF
TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AN)D ASSOCI.A!T·E JUSTICES OF THE SUPRE·ME
COURT OF THE STATE OF u~T~H:
Come now the defendants in the a:hove-entitled
cause and petition this Honorable Court for a rehear-
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ing upon said cause of action for the reasons and upon
the grounds hereinafter briefly set forth:

I.
That this Honorable Court erred in interpreting
and applying the provisions of Chapter 13, Title 80,
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933.

II.
That this Honorable Court erred in applying and
interpreting the provisions of Section 80-13-21, Revised
Statutes of Utah, 1933.

III.
That this Honorable Court erred in holding that
dividends received from stock owned by the plaintiff
corporation in other corporations were not allocable to
the business of plaintiff corporation in the State of
Utah.

IV.
That this Honorable Court erred in holding that
gains to the plaintiff corporation derived from the sale
of stocks owned by plaintiff were not alloca:hle to the
business of the plaintiff corporation done in the State
of Utah.
•

.J
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR
REHEARING
At the outset it is to be remembered that the plaintiff corporation during the year in question had its sole
and only place of business at Ogden, Utah. , (See pages
2 and 3 of the main brief of defendants.) With that
fact established the conclusion is irresistible that plaintiff, during the year in question, exercised its franchise
to do business as a corporation nowhere other than the
State of Utah.
We submit that, starting with this basic fact, the
conclusions of the majority opinion under subsections
2 and 3 of the opinion are not sound.
Let us test the results of those conclusions by assuming factual situations other than those presented by the
case at bar.
I

RECEIPT OF DIVIDENDS
By subdivision 2 of the majority opinion, the Court
has held that the provisions of Section 80-13-21, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, and more specifically sub~
sections (1) and (3), exclude from the taxable income
of an investment company doing business only in this
state all so-called financial income in the form of dividends, if those dividends were declared and paid to
the ,corporation doing, business in this state by a corporation not doing business in this state.
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The result is that the only dividends received by a
corporation doing business in this state which can be
taxed as income under our corporation franchise tax
would be dividends received from operating companies
which did their sole business within the State of Utah.
We say sole business because it would seem obvious
that any attempt to break down a dividend paid by an
operating company, which operated in more than one
state, into profits from the business done in this or that
state would be administratively impossible. This line of
reasoning leads to the conclusion that if dividends or
other such financial income are to be taxed as income to
a corporation holding the stock, such dividends must be
taxed twice; first, to the Utah company earning them
in the form of income to that company and, second, in
the form of income to the investment company receiving the dividends. Otherwise, they cannot be taxed
at all.
For example, assume that Company A, an operating company, does business in twelve states, including
Utah. Company B, an investment company, owns stock
of Company A. Let us further assume that Company
B has its sole and only office and place of business in
the State of Utah. Company A declares a dividend for
the year in question of $144.00 per share. How much
:)f this dividend can be taxed as income to Company B
rnder the Court's present interpretation of ''dividends
:l:erived from business done within this state''~ Let us
tssume that, for the purpose of Company A's corpora-
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tion franchise tax, there is allocated to the State of
Utah one-twelfth of its income. Is the Tax Commission arbitrarily to say that one-twelfth of the dividend
is derived from the business done in this state and assign that portion of the dividend to Company B 's taXiable income1 Or is Company B to be permitted to show
that the $144.00 dividend declared during the year in
question was all declared from A's reserves and that
the Utah business of Company A during the time those
reserves were built up was a losing proposition~
Furthermore, by the explicit terms of the corporation franchise tax act (Section 80-13-65) it is unlawful
for the Commission or any agent of the Commission to
divulge or make known in any manner the amount of
income or any particular set forth or disclosed in any report or return required under the act. If the Commission were to allocate the dividends of the operating
company on the same basis as that company's own income is allocated for the purpose of its tax, we would,
we submit, be illegally divulging information and,
therefore, could not follow that procedure.
The result under this illustration would be that
none of Company A's dividend. could be assigned as
having been derived from business done in this state
and Company B would not he taxable on the receipt of
any part of the dividend. This, in spite of the fact that
Company B 's sole and only exercise of its franchise was
within the State of Utah I
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To further illustrate the impossibility, if not illegality, of ·any method of breaking down dividends of an operating company doing business in Utah and other states,
let us assume the A Railroad Company to be the operating company doing business in twelve states, including
Utah. The A Railroad Company owns stock in Companies X, Y and Z. Company X owns and operates a
coal mine in the State of Colorado and does business
nowhere else. Company Y owns ~nd operates an oil well
in the State of Wyoming and does ·business nowhere
else. Company Z owns timber and operates a saw mill
in the State of Oregon and does business nowhere else.
Companies X, Y and Z pay to Company A dividends
during the taxable year in question in the total amount
of $100.00. Company A in turn declares a dividend
from its corporate funds in the same amount, namely
$100.00. Company B, the investment company, owning stock of Company A, receives the $100.00 dividend.
Remembering that Company B has its sole office in the
State of Utah and under our assumption does business
in no other state, how much, if any, of the $100.00 divi:lend received from Company A is taxable to Company
B by the State of Utah f
Let us change the last illustration slightly. ComJanies X, Y and Z each own stock in Companies L, M
tnd N, doing business in several states, and receive
lividends from those companies. The dividends from
~' Y and Z to A are from corporate funds which in~lude dividends from L, M and N. What part of the
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dividend received by B from A is taxable1
Let us change our illustration again. Assume that
Company A, the operating company, does business only
in the State of Wyoming. Company B, the investment
company, owning stock of Company A, does business
only in the State of Utah. Under the Court's decision,
none of the $100.00 dividend from Company A could be
taxed to Company B when computing Company B 's
franchise tax. Assuming, however, that both Company
A and Company B do business only in the State of
Utah, when Company A reports its income for franchise
tax purposes, Utah will tax all of its income. Out of
this income, already taxed once by the State of Utah,
it declares its dividend. Under the majority opinion,
Company B 's taxable income would include, in the full
amount, the $100.00 dividend.. Thus we see that Utah
either will tax twice or it cannot tax at all.
Suppose a corporation is formed under the laws of
Nevada. This corporation enters into the banking business in Salt Lake City, Utah, where it owns and operates a bank. The Utah bank is its only enterprise and
its only offices are located at that bank. A bank, of
course, makes its profits solely on investments. Suppose its investments are in stocks and bonds of corporations doing business only outside the State of Utah.
Surely the Court would not have us say that the bank's
income is not taxable! Suppose, instead of being in,corporated under the the laws of Nevada, the bank is a
Utah corporation. Under the majority opinion this
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would make no difference and the result would be the
same-non taxability.
Suppose this bank loaned money to a sheepman
for use in operating a Wyoming sheep outfit as an individual and that all negotiations on the loan, payments, renewals, etc., were done at the bank in Salt
Lake City. Could Utah tax the interest paid to the
hank under the majority opinion~
The illustrations and examples above assumed could
be multiplied indefinitely.. Without meaning to overburden this Honorable Court let us assume only one
more example. Company B, the investment company,
doing business only in the State of Utah, holds United
States Government securities and receives interest
thereon. Under the majority opinion, would Utah be
able to tax such income as being interest ''derived from
business done within this state''~
Consider, also, the position of the taxpayer-corporation, Company B, in our examples above. How is
chat company to know, under the ruling of the Court,
what part, if any, of a. dividend received by that com~any is to be reported for tax to the State of Utah~
B:ow is Company B to ascertain and compute the
tmount of the dividend it receives which was due to
>usiness of the paying corporation within the State of
Jtah ~ Company B has no facilities for determining
mch proportion, has no grounds for making a demand
'or information from the paying corporation and no
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means at its command to force the paying corporation to
supply it with a breakdown to enable it to report correctly tax liahili ty.
Therefore, considered both from the standpoint of
the Tax Commission as the administrator of the tax and
from the standpoint of the taxpayer in making correct
returns of tax liability, the opinion of the Court is impossible of practical application. Taxation is intensely
practical. And where two interpretations are possible,
one practical and the other impractical, the former
should be adopted. Therefore, admitting only for the
sake of this point, that the majority opinion presents a
possible interpretation, we submit that the one which we
shall in this brief proffer should be adopted.
Our main purpose in assuming these situations is
to illustrate to the Court what we believe to be the fundamental fallacy present in arriving at the conClusion
under point 2 of the majority opinion. That fundamental fallacy is that when the statute in Section 80-13-21
(1) and (3) speaks of "business done within this state",
it is referring not to the business of the operating company which pays the dividend but to the business of
the investment or other company holding the securities
and receiving the dividend. The business of an investment company is not the same type of business as that
of an operating company. In a given case the business
of an investment company may be solely and only to
sit quietly by, receive dividends and interest on its investments and. declare, out of that income, dividends to
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its own stockholders. The physical evidences of its
business may consist of nothing more than a bookkeeper
receiving dividend checks, depositing the same to the
company's accounts and then, upon action of the board
of directors, mailing out the company's own dividend
checks. If all the business of an investment company is
done within the State of Utah, then we submit that the
interest, rents, dividends-the financial income of that
investment company-are derived from its business done
within the State and hence are clearly taxable.
That such was the intent of the legislature is demonstrated by a careful study of the entire corporation
franchise tax act. Whenever the phrase, ''business done
within the state" or the word ":business" is used, it is
ased as referring to the business of the particular tax~ayer-corporation involved; not the business of some
)ther ,corporation from whom the instant taxpayer may
~eceive dividends or interest on an investment. The op~rating company from whom the dividends are received
s a total stranger to the situation so far as the tax
iability of the particular corporation involved in any
ax case is concerned.
The legislative intent is also demonstrated from a
,tudy of the Report of the Tax Revision Commission
~f the State of Utah, 19'29, and the Governor's roesage to the 1931 Session of the Legislature. In the Govrnor 's message, see Senate Journal, Utah, 1931, pp.
2-58, we find throughout that document numerous refrences to the need for taxing the income from intangi1
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bles, both to individuals and to corporations. At page
25 of the Senate Journal, then Governor George H. J)ern
said, referring to changes in taxation possible by reason
of constitutional amendments and recommending such
changes:
'' 2. The enactment of a more equitable income tax than was formerly permissable. The
constitution before amendment exempted mortgages and shares of stock in corporations whose
property was already assessed and also allowed
a deduction of debits and credits. Under that
situation the Legislature could have laid an income tax upon every wage earner and salaried
person but could not have touched the investor
who was enjoying a large income from stocks,
bonds and mortgages. It could have taxed the
business profits of the merchant, the manufacturer, the miner and the public utility, but it could
not reach corporations which derived their incomes from intangible property." (It·alics ours.)
Again at Page 29, the Governor said:
''The alternative to a property tax on intangibles must necessarily be a small personal and
corporation income tax. A tax based upon income is undoubtedly the best if not the ideal method of taxing intarngibles. It imposes no burden
upon any person or corporation that is not earning a net income, hence it ·can never encroach upon
a capital investment. In a time of depression
like the present it cannot hurt a business, because if the busines~ is not making money it will
have no tax to pay. On the other hand it seems
obvious that a person or a corporation earning
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a net income in times like these can afford to pay
an income tax and will not be hurt by it.'' (Italics
ours.)
When, in the latter quotation, the Governor referred to a corporation tax measured by income, he was
referring especially to income from intangibles. This
is clearly demonstrated by the content of the message
preceding the quotation.
In the Tax Revision Commission Report, supra, is
again found, with emphasis by repetition, the recommendation that income from intangibles be taxed to
corporations. See especially pp. 30-36, p. 49, p. 67. We
respectfully recommend to the Court the reading of this
report in its entirety for a picture of what the legislature intended to reach by the corporation franchise
tax,· for the law actually enacted, when accurately interpreted, will be seen as covering the proposals of the
Revision Commission.
We believe that a reading of this report will also
iemonstrate that the phrase, "business done within the
State of Utah", must be interpreted to mean the busi:tess of the taxpayer-corporation involved; not that of
wme other company or individual.
One more question which the majority opmwn
and to which we see no logical answer under the
)pinion-where are the interest and dividends constitutng the sole income of an investment company attribuable for purpose of a corporation franchise tax? Ad-

~aises
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mittedly, or at least it would seem logically, an investment company exercises its franchise somewhere. Where
the investment company involved has its sole office and,
so far as the record goes, performs every corporate act
within the State of Utah, we would think that the only
place such corporation exercised its franchise was within
the State of Utah. Yet, by the majority opinion, none of
the income of an investment company exercising its
franchise only in the State of Utah and receiving its dividends from an operating company doing business outside the State of Utah is taxable by the State of Utah.
Since, under our supposition, the particular investment
company exercises its franchise in no other state, certainly, or at least it would so seem to us, no other state
could exact a franchise tax from that investment company. Surely this Court would not say that Ohio could. tax
the American Investment Corporation when it does nothing there? Surely the State of New York could not tax it
under a franchise tax. It is not within the jurisdictional
limits of those states. Yet, by inference from the opinion, those are the only states which can tax. The anomalous conclusion is that although the investment company indisputably exercises its franchise, it cannot be
taxed anywhere.
These comments will apply not only to an investment company, but also to every operating company,
which, as an incidental part of its business, makes investments in other companies.
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II
CAPITAL GAINS FROM SALE.S
The same fundamental fallacy which we have attempted to point out as existent in the decision under
point 2 of the majority opinion is, we believe, carried
over, but to an even more forced degree, to the reasoning
by which the result under point 3 is reached. There the
majority opinion reaches the conclusion that gains to a
corporation resulting from the sale of securities owned
by the corporation are not taxable even though there
is not even a scintilla of evidence that the corporation
so much as raised a finger outside the State of Utah.
Apparently, the Court reaches this conclusion because
the stock was sold through a Salt Lake City brokerage
house on the New York Stock Exchange. The Court
must, therefore, consider that the gain resulting from
the sale was the result of business done outside
the
,
State of Utah. But who did the business~ If we are
to look to the business of the taxpayer-corporation to
determine the taxability of a gain, then we frankly fail
to see any basis for the Court's decision. If, however,
[n determining the taxable income of the American Investment Corporation we must look to the activities of
J. A. Hogle & Company or its New York brokerage conlection, then we submit this Court has laid down a to;ally inapplicable and unworkable rule.
~ule

Let us assume for the moment that the majority's
is correct; namely, that we look not to the activi-
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ties of the taxpayer, but to the activities of a brokerage
house in connection with the allocation of a gain resulting from the sale of securities by the taxpayer. Under that rule, if the brokerage house sells the stock to
someone outside the state through the New York Stock
Exchange, the resulting gain is not taxable. Assuming, however, that the brokerage house sold the stock
over its local counter to a Utah purchaser, what would
be the result? Assume that the brokerage house sold
the stock over its local counter to a resident of the State
of California who was stopping only temporarily in the
State of Utah at the time of the purchase, what would
be the result? We submit that the basis of the tax cannot be the activities of the brokerage house; it must be
the activities of the taxpayer-corporation whose stock
is sold. If those activities, if the only uses of the corporate franchise in connection with the sale, are within the State of Utah, we fail to see how the gain resulting from such a sale can be allocated or attributed, so
far as the corporation is concerned, anywhere other
than the State of Utah.
Most of the cases cited in the majority opinion in
support of its ·conclusion in this regard are income tax
cases. Let us follow the reasoning and the conclusion
of the majority opinion based upon income cases to its
logical conclusion. An individual owns stock of the
American Telephone & Telegraph Company. He sells
that stock through J. A. Hogle & Company on the New
York Stock Exchange. Is any gain which the individ-
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ual may derive from that sale taxable by the State of
Utah under an income tax~ We have thought that the
answer would certainly be in the affirmative. This opinion, however, would raise a grave question.
Suppose a corporation organized under the laws
of the State of Utah is engaged in the primary business of owning and operating a grocery and food market. 'So far as its operations are concerned, it does business nowhere other than the State of Utah. This corporation owns stock as an investment in General Motors Corporation. If this corporation, solely and only
a Utah corporation so far as its activities are concerned,
were to realize a gain from the sale of that General
Motors stock over the New York Stock Ex:change, this
Court would have us say that such gain is not allocable
to the State of Utah so far as the operating company's
income is concerned. We submit that there is no authority for such a proposition.
Moreover, we believe that the opinion has attempted
to assign the income resulting in the form of capital
gains under the wrong section of the statute. It is not
~lear exactly which section the Court felt covered the
~ssigning of capital gains, but we submit that such in3ome must ,be assigned either under 80-13-21 ( 5) or 80l3-21 ( 6). There is no other section applicable. The
]rst four subsections of 80-13-21 are by their very terms
;vholly inapplicable. Subsections (2) and (4) refer only
;o real property and tangible personalty. Subsections
)) ,and (3) have no reference to capital gains.
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vV e must, therefore, choose between subsections ( 5)
and ( 6). Since the Court recognizes that the American
Investment Corporation does business only in Utah, subsection (6) becomes inapplicable. Thus, by a process
of elimination, as well as, we submit, because of the clear
intent as expressed. in subsection ( 5), that subsection
must govern. And by its terms, where the corporation
''carries on no business outside this state, the whole
of the remainder of net income", is to be allocated to
business done in Utah.

We also respectfully refer the Court to a reading
of subsection (5) in conjunction with subsection (3)
and the other subsections of 80-13-21 in arriving at the
proper interpretation of the phrase "business done within the state". It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that all parts of the statute are to be read together. See also sections 80-13-6 (1), 80-13-12, 13 and 14.
When s~ read, it becomes clear that the business to
be considered is the business of the taxpayer-corporation, not that of any other person or corporation. This
reasoning and result is also applicable in allocating
the receipt of dividends to Utah under subsection (3).
Before closing this brief, we feel it mandatory upon
us to call the majority's attention to certain statements
in the reasoning under point 1 of the opinion. We agree
with the conclusion reached under point 1, but we feel
that the Court may have made some unnecessary statements which may in later litigation come back to plague
the Court.
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In the course of the reasoning under the first point,
the majority indicates that if a corporation acts ultra
vires and those ultra vires acts result in income to the
corporation, the State of Utah cannot tax that income
under its corporation franchise tax act. Apparently, the
fundamental theory is that only income legally earned
can be taxed. If such a theory is sound, then we submit
AI Capone paid the Federal Government an enormous
amount of money to which that government was not entitled. Suppose a individual holds a winning ticket in
the Irish Sweepstakes. Gambling is illegal. jTherefore,
the State of Utah could not tax that individual on his
winnings!
Suppose the officers of a corporation were to sell
out all the capital assets of the corporation without the
consent of the stockholders. And, should there be any
argument as to their power to do so, let us assume further that such action would be ultra vires, if not otherwise illegal. Apparently, this Court would have us
say that any gain realized by the corporation from such
action would not be taxable.
We feel that this Court does not desire to lay down
such a rule. It is not necessary to the result reached
under point 1. We submit that the test as to whether
a corporation falls within a particular category, such as
:'holding company", "non-profit organization", "chari.,.
cable or eleemosynary corporation'', is to be determined
)n a dual basis-either by what the corporate charter
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permits it to do or by what it actually does.
In this connection we refer the Court to Section
80-13-1 (3) under which definition, for the purpose of the
corporation franchise tax, there need not even be a formal charter g-ranted to an association in order for the
association to be liable to the tax. So long as any group
or association of individuals does business in a corporate form or manner, the association is liable to the tax.
Therefore, it matters not whether the acts which produce the income are ultra vires a particular, formal
charter or are completely ultra vires in the sense of
doing business as a corporation without any charter
whatsoever.
Let us test this conclusion which we proffer by one
more example. Suppose that Company A, doing business
completely within the law, failed to pay its corporation franchise tax for 1939. By the provisions of section 80-13-62 its charter must be suspended. Suppose
that Company A's charter is suspended, but during the
subsequent years of 1940 and 1941 the corporation proceeds to do business in exactly the same manner and
form as in previous years. Surely this Court would not
have us say that such corporation is not liable for the
franchise tax during the years 1940 and 1941.
The mere fact that criminal penalties exist to
which such corporation might be liable is no basis and
no reason for not assessing the tax. I may injure someone while operating my automobile at an unlawful rate
of speed. It has never been thought that merely he-
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cause I may be liable to criminal punishment, I am not
also liable to civil redress. Similarly, merely because a
group of individuals illegally operates as a corporation
and hence subjeets itself to criminal liability is no basis
·or reason for concluding that such operations are not
subject to legitimate taxes which by their specific terms
are applicable.
III

CONCLUSION
We, therefore, submit that the majority opinion ·has
misconceived and misinterpreted the applicable provisions of our corporation franchise tax act. The rule laid
down in the majority opinion will completely nullify the
tax so far as investment eompanies are concerned, so
far as any taxation by the State of Utah of financial
income to any corporation is concerned and so far as
the taxation by the State of Utah of any gains resulting
from any corporate sales of securities.

The reasoning

in the opinion will result disastrously in its ramifications
:tnd repercussions, not only on the corporation franchise
tax but on many other taxes. We sincerely believe that
~his

Court should reconsider its decision and to that

md pray that this Court grant this petition for rehearng and give your defendants an opportunity to present
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further analysis of authorities and further reasoning
to this Honorable Court.
Respectfully submitted,
GARFIELD 0. ANDERSON
GRANT A. BROWN,
Attorneys for Petitioners.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

